Limited Shifts in the Cyber Threat Landscape Driven by COVID-19

Though COVID-19 has had enormous effects on our society and economy,
its effects on the cyber threat landscape remain limited. For the most
part, the same actors we have always tracked are behaving in the same
manner they did prior to the crisis. There are some new challenges,
but they are perceptible, and we—and our customers—are prepared to
continue this fight through this period of unprecedented change.

The significant shifts in the threat landscape we are currently
tracking include:

  • The sudden major increase in a remote workforce has changed
    the nature and vulnerability of enterprise networks.
  • Threat
    actors are now leveraging COVID-19 and related topics in social
    engineering ploys.
  • We anticipate increased collection by
    cyber espionage actors seeking to gather intelligence on the
  • Healthcare operations, related manufacturing,
    logistics, and administration organizations, as well as government
    offices involved in responding to the crisis are increasingly
    critical and vulnerable to disruptive attacks such as
  • Information operations actors have seized on the
    crisis to promote narratives primarily to domestic or near-abroad

Same Actors, New Content

The same threat actors and malware families that we observed prior
to the crisis are largely pursuing the same objectives as before the
crisis, using many of the same tools. They are simply now leveraging
the crisis as a means of social engineering. This pattern of behavior
is familiar. Threat actors have always capitalized on major events and
crises to entice users. Many of the actors who are now using this
approach have been tracked for years.

Ultimately, COVID-19 is being adopted broadly in social engineering
approaches because it is has widespread, generic appeal, and there is
a genuine thirst for information on the subject that encourages users
to take actions when they might otherwise have been circumspect. We
have seen it used by several cyber criminal and cyber espionage
actors, and in underground communities some actors have created tools
to enable effective social engineering exploiting the coronavirus
pandemic. Nonetheless, COVID-19 content is still only used in two
percent of malicious emails.


For the time being, we do not believe this social engineering will
be abetting. In fact, it is likely to take many forms as changes in
policy, economics, and other unforeseen consequences manifest.
Recently we predicted a spike
in stimulus related social engineering
, for example.
Additionally, the FBI has recently released a press
anticipating a rise in COVID-19 related Business Email
Compromise (BEC) scams.

State Actors Likely Very Busy

Given that COVID-19 is the undoubtedly the overwhelming concern of
governments worldwide for the time being, we anticipated targeting of
government, healthcare, biotech, and other sectors by cyber espionage
actors. We have not yet observed an incident of cyber espionage
targeting COVID-19 related information; however, it is often difficult
to determine what information these actors are targeting. There has
been at least one case reported publicly which we have not
independently confirmed.

We have seen state actors, such as those from Russia, China and
North Korea, leverage COVID-19 related social engineering, but given
wide interest in that subject, that does not necessarily indicate
targeting of COVID-19 related information.

Threat to Healthcare

Though we have no reason to believe there is a sudden, elevated
threat to healthcare, the criticality of these systems has probably
never been greater, and thus the risk to this sector will be elevated
throughout this crisis. The threat of disruption is especially
disconcerting as it could affect the ability of these organizations to
provide safe and timely care. This threat extends beyond hospitals to
pharmaceutical companies, as well as manufacturing, administration and
logistics organizations providing vital support. Additionally, many
critical public health resources lie at the state and local level.

Though there is some anecdotal evidence suggesting some ransomware
actors are avoiding healthcare targets, we do not expect that all
actors will practice this restraint. Additionally, an attack on state
and local governments, which have been a major target of ransomware
actors, could have a disruptive effect on treatment and prevention efforts.

Remote Work

The sudden and unanticipated shift of many workers to work from home
status will represent an opportunity for threat actors. Organizations
will be challenged to move quickly to ensure sufficient capacity, as
well as that security controls and policies are in place. Disruptive
situations can reduce morale and increase stress, leading to adverse
behavior such as decreasing users’ reticence to open suspicious
messages, and even increasing the risk of insider threats.
Distractions while working at home can cause lowered vigilance in
scrutinizing and avoiding suspicious content as workers struggle to
balance work and home responsibilities at the same time. Furthermore,
the rapid adoption of platforms will undoubtedly lead to security
mistakes and attract the attention of the threat actors.

Secure remote access will likely rely on use of VPNs and user access
permissions and authentication procedures intended to limit exposure
of proprietary data. Hardware and infrastructure protection should
include ensuring full disk encryption on enterprise devices,
maintaining visibility on devices through an endpoint security tool,
and maintaining regular software updates. 

For more on this issue, see our blog post on the risks
associated with remote connectivity

The Information Operations Threat

We have seen information operations actors promote narratives
associated with COVID-19 to manipulate primarily domestic or
near-abroad audiences. We observed accounts in Chinese-language
networks operating in support of the People’s Republic of China (PRC),
some of which we previously identified to be promoting messaging
pertaining to the Hong Kong protests, shift their focus to praising
the PRC’s response to the COVID-19 outbreak, criticizing the response
of Hong Kong medical workers and the U.S. to the pandemic, and
covertly promoting a conspiracy theory that the U.S. was responsible
for the outbreak of the coronavirus in Wuhan.

We have also identified multiple information operations promoting
COVID-19-related narratives that were aimed at Russian- and
Ukrainian-speaking audiences, including some that we assess with high
confidence are part of the broader suspected Russian influence
campaign publicly referred to as “Secondary Infektion,” as
well as other suspected Russian activity. These operations have
included leveraging a false hacktivist persona to spread the
conspiracy theory that the U.S. developed the coronavirus in a weapons
laboratory in Central Asia, taking advantage of physical protests in
Ukraine to push the narrative that Ukrainians repatriated from Wuhan
will infect the broader Ukrainian population, and claiming that the
Ukrainian healthcare system is ill-equipped to deal with the pandemic.
Other operations alleged that U.S. government or military personnel
were responsible for outbreaks of the coronavirus in various countries
including Lithuania and Ukraine, or insisted that U.S. personnel would
contribute to the pandemic’s spread if scheduled multilateral military
exercises in the region were to continue as planned.


It is clear that adversaries expect us to be distracted by these
overwhelming events. The greatest cyber security challenge posed by
COVID-19 may be our ability to stay focused on the threats that matter
most. An honest assessment of the cyber security implications of the
pandemic will be necessary to make efficient use of resources limited
by the crisis itself.

For more information and resources that can help strengthen
defenses, visit FireEye’s “Managing
Through Change and Crisis
” site, which aggregates many
resources to help organizations that are trying to navigate COVID-19
related security challenges.